An important contributor of the complexity in decisionmaking stems from the fact that human beings are imperfect information processors, we are not always rational. Personal insights about uncertainty and preference can be both limiting and misleading, even while the individual making the judgments may demonstrate an amazing overconfidence. An awareness of human limitations is critical in developing good decision-making procedures. To our knowledge, very little has been published in the exploration & production literature on the "cognitive"; i.e., the "thinking", social, judgmental and emotional aspects of decision-making.
Yet, in spite of these obvious advantages, people treat these with a nearly instinctive distaste. They are particularly resistant to the idea that simple models can validly make such subjective evaluations. For some, that resistance may stem simply from unfamiliarity with the statistics and probability involved. Many more, however, subscribe to the widespread assumption that human judgment is more discerning than a model. They are reluctant to believe that simple mathematical calculations can match the complexity of the human mind. "Take away an ordinary person's illusions," says Dr. Relling in Henrik Ibsen's Villanden, "and you take away happiness at the same time."
Even today, after decades of research on the psychological aspects of judgment and decision-making, people continue to assume that intuition, repeated experience and their general intelligence will see them through. Unfortunately, intuition and repetition are unreliable teachers at best. Research shows that the less competent people are, the less likely they are to know it. Overconfidence is a deeply rooted human characteristic. Not only do most people tend to hold overly favorable views of their intellectual and interpersonal abilities, but those who are the least accomplished overestimate their performance and ability the most. In other words, those who most need training to improve their decision-making abilities are the least likely to recognize it. Instead, like drunken drivers who are certain that their reflexes are unimpaired, they proceed with the mistaken impression they are doing just fine.
A particularly interesting aspect of human judgment and decision-making are the traps we unknowingly step into. Many decision-makers believe that intuition, repeated experience and their general intelligence will see them through. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the paper, intuition and repetition are unreliable teachers at best.
In this paper we will illustrate how a cognitive perspective can offer practical suggestions on how to deal with many common problems in decision-making. The findings presented here are not novel and we have borrowed liberally from the pioneers and prominent researchers in the exploration of the minds of the decision-maker such as Kahneman and Tversky, 3 Russo and Schoemaker, [4] [5] Thaler, 6 March, 7 and Plous. 8 Yet, given the tendency of geo-scientists and engineers to focus on the "hard" elements of decision-making such as techniques and tools for quantifying uncertainty and risk, and not so much on the qualitative elements such as the cognitive and judgment aspects, we believe there is a need to broaden the understanding and appreciation of cognitive aspects. In this paper we are merely "touching the surface" of this field and we strongly encourage the interested reader to further explore this fascinating field by reading the original references. A good understanding of the behavioral elements of decisionmaking will lead to improved decision quality and, ultimately, to improved corporate performance.
Good Decisions -Process vs. Outcome
Most decision makers focus on outcome. This is not surprising as most organizations reward -or penalize -people based on the outcomes of their decisions. Results are what matter. Indeed, many people believe that good outcomes are synonymous with a good process, that good outcomes necessarily imply that a good process was used. They often assume the converse is true as well: that a poor outcome necessarily signals a poor or incompetent process. Furthermore, if a company's or a managers track record is based on just a few "big" decisions instead of numerous small ones, a focus on outcomes carries the risk of rewarding good luck -or penalizing bad luck.
The best hope for a good decision outcome is a good decision process. The main reason for this is that this forces the decision-makers to focus on what actually is under their control.
Three things influence outcomes:
By definition, we cannot control the factors in the chance category. A good decision-making process, even when tied to excellent implementation, will not guarantee a good outcome 100 percent of the time. Bad luck happens. But clearly, the closest guarantee of a good outcome is a good decisionmaking process followed by good implementation. In "the long run", or statistically, using a good decision-making process will ensure a good outcome.
Decision-makers who use a good decision process and achieve a good outcome deserve recognition. But someone who uses a good process and is met by failure deserves praise as well, for this decision-maker may simply have been unlucky. Likewise, someone who employs a poor decision process but is met with world-class success deserves neither praise nor promotion as this individual is simply very lucky. This is elegantly summarized by Russo and Schoemaker 5 in the following table. What then, constitutes a good decision-making process?
The Decision-Analysis Process A number of excellent books have been written on decisionmaking and decision-making processes. [9] [10] These processes are typically broken down into several stages. The following four stages provide the backbone of almost any decision process:
1. Framing: Framing determines the viewpoint from which decision-makers look at the issue and sets parameters for prioritizing the relevant aspects of the problem. It provides preliminary guidance on selecting criteria for one option over others. 2. Gathering Intelligence: Intelligence-gatherers must gather "knowables," the facts and options and produce reasonable evaluations of "unknowables" to enable decision-making under uncertainty. 3. Coming to Conclusions: Sound framing and good intelligence will not guarantee a good decision. People cannot consistently make good decisions using seat-of-the-pants judgment alone, even with excellent data in front of them. A systematic approach will lead to better choice definition -and it usually does so far more efficiently than hours spent in unorganized thinking. 4. Learning from Experience: Only by systematically learning from the results of past decisions can decision-makers continually improve their skills. Further, if learning begins when a decision is first implemented, early refinements to the decision or implementation plan can be made that could mean the difference between success and failure.
Decision-making is typically an iterative process. As the process moves along new alternatives may be identified, the model structure may change and the models of uncertainty and preference may need to be refined. This four-stage process is a framework, not a series of rigid rules. They should be use flexibly.
Human judgment plays into all stages of the process. The purpose of this paper is not so much to review and illustrate particular techniques but rather to illustrate how the human mind and human judgment can play havoc with our analysis, intuition and decision-making. We therefore focus most of our discussion on the second and third stage of the process where decision-makers are particularly prone to fall into traps of overconfidence and decision biases. These two stages are also where prudent decision-makers spend most of their time.
Framing
Most books on decision-analysis include a discussion of framing and illustrate techniques for opening our minds, creating awareness and challenge ourselves. People intuitively know something about frames. We allude to them when we talk about "thinking outside the box," "not being on the same page" or "it's all in how you look at it." We experience frames when we meet people who just seem to immediately understand us, with whom we "click," as well as in the frustrating alternative of trying to talk with others who just don't seem to "get it" no matter how much we try to explain.
These different ways of looking at the world can be explained by what cognitive scientists call "frames." Frames are mental structures that simplify and guide our understanding of a complex reality. Everyone must inevitably adopt some kind of simplifying perspective. We are bombarded daily with far more information than we could ever hope to process or use. If we don't focus our attention on some things and ignore others, we will quickly be consumed solely with trying to make sense of the world around us.
Unfortunately, frames do more than limit our view; they themselves can be hard to see and change. Using a window analogy, 5 we can see the broadest panorama by standing close to the window, with our nose pressed against the glass. But to see the window itself and, more important, to notice that the room may have other windows offering different views, we must step back. People often find it hard to see their frames unless they have been trained to do so or warned that they are there. Yet if we don't recognize that we are looking at the world through only the eastern window, we will never know when we need to check the view from one or several of the other windows. And when we as decision-makers confuse the view we see from one, or even two, windows with the entire panorama, we can get caught off guard, thinking our decisionmaking perspective is more complete than it really is. It is important to remind ourselves that our frame does not capture all of reality as we can be lulled into thinking that our decision-making perspective is more complete than it really is.
Framing has received renewed attention after the emergence of real option thinking as a way of managing decision-making and investments under uncertainty. 11 Options are the lifeblood of decisions. Without good alternatives to choose from, it is impossible to make a good decision.
Gathering Intelligence
Two decades ago, a section on gathering intelligence might have focused on how to gather information. Today, the real question for decision-makers is how to create intelligence. In exploration & production decision-making, as in most other fields, the decision-makers face a barrage of information. Clearly, with the improved data collection tools and the increased focus and enhancements of real time seismic interpretation tools and eFields type operations, we will see an exponential increase in the amount of available information. The challenge then is to turn information into insight.
On paper, the process for gathering intelligence appears trivial:
1. Ask the most appropriate questions. 2. Gather the data and interpret the analysis of the data properly. 3. Decide when to quit searching further.
Unfortunately, there lurks a series of human traps in each step, traps that stem from common biases in the way peoplein the absence of training -process information. There is, in particular, a hidden cost of undue optimism and false efficiency that we will cover in more detail below. This, of course, does not mean that we advocate pessimism or inefficiency but rather that undue optimism and false efficiency regularly trip up decision-makers, leading to major miscalculations and faulty choices. Undue Optimism and Overconfidence. As successful professionals we like to believe that we are hardheaded realists. We take pride in making decisions that are datadriven and in consistently separating opinion from fact. Often, we do just that. An unrealistic view of our knowledge and ability can lead to undue optimism about what we do and don't know. Just consider the following quotes: 5 • That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I'm willing to stand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit it from the air. • Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.
-Lord Kelvin, British mathematician, physicist, and president of the British Royal Society, spoken in 1895.
• A severe depression like that of 1920-21 is outside the range of probability.
-Harvard Economic Society, Weekly Letter, November 16, 1929 .
• I think there is a world market for about five computers.
-Thomas J. Watson, chairman of IBM, 1943.
• These people were all respected for their knowledge and rigorous thinking skills. They were also adamantly certain they were correct. How could people of such high caliber be so wrong? The most obvious answer is that they made an error in judgment, a mistake that could befall even the best decision-makers. More likely, their main error was one much more reprehensible to a decision-maker than an occasional mistaken belief. Their major mistake was holding their beliefs with utter conviction without considering whether the available information justified the depth of that conviction. Such overconfidence, along with other biases stemming from an inflated sense of knowledge and ability, can be categorized as "undue optimism." Good decision-making requires not only knowing the facts, but understanding the limits of our knowledge. As Confucius stated it: "To know that we know what we know and that we do not know what we do not know, that is true knowledge."
Seeing What We Believe. Most of possess a built-in tendency to favor evidence that supports our current beliefs and to dismiss evidence that challenges them. Psychologists call this tendency "confirmation bias." 3 Its existence is not surprising. Confirming evidence gives a mental reward saying "You're on the right track. You're doing a good job." While the tendency to seek confirmation is seductive, it is acutely dangerous to decision-makers, causing them to neglect evidence that might undermine their ideas. This bias often leads decision-making processes far off course. Wishful thinking also distorts how we interpret information and it does so far more often than diligent professionals would like to believe. We should never be too quick to take "yes" for an answer but should make it a habit to seek evidence that disproves our favorite or desired outcome. We should always consider and test multiple hypotheses and should make it a habit to ask people, and ourselves, how they know what they assert to know, the process they used to arrive at their conclusions, the evidence they can muster pro and con and so on.
The Hidden Cost of False Efficiency.
As decision-makers we should always begin the decision process by asking: What information would make this decision easy? What is the quickest, easiest and least expensive way to gather that information? In some cases that may be all that is needed. Wherever possible, we should favor simple intelligencegathering approaches. However, there are well-documented traps inherent in the quest for efficiency that can leave decision-makers with a false sense of security -and poor intelligence. Two of the most dangerous shortcuts in the intelligence-gathering phase are:
• The tendency to pay too much attention to the most readily available information, and • The tendency to excessively anchor opinions in a single statistics or fact that from then on dominates the thinking process.
Some people realize that they can fall victim to "availability bias." They know that they base some judgments on evidence that comes most easily to mind. They also know that television, newspapers and other readily available information sources can skew their views of reality. They know that the information that is most "available" is not always the most representative or relevant. However, few put these realizations together when making important judgments.
Availability bias takes several forms. Our perceptions are distorted not only by the most available and the most vivid information, but also by the most recent. For example, suppose you discuss with a friend whether to buy a new Volvo or Saab. Suppose that a customer survey leads you to favor the Saab. A stranger overhearing your decision chimes in with a disaster story about his Saab: the brakes failed twice in the first year. Will you buy the Saab?
Statistically, your sample of car owners' opinions has increased from 1,000 to 1,001. Thus, the painful tale of one Saab's flaws should carry no more than a one-thousandth weight. Not only does the story's concrete, vivid detail overwhelm such reasonable consideration, but we tend to overemphasize the most recent information we receive. That's why the last person to get the boss' ear often has the advantage and why the closing argument of a trial can sway the jurors. It is therefore important to realize that our perceptions of the "facts" are often distorted by the most available, most recent or most vivid information.
Availability Bias. These types of biases, and particularly the "vividness" bias, are hard to overcome. That is why people tend to be more afraid of highly reported, horrific accidents such as airplane crashes, earthquakes and nuclear meltdowns than the more common but underreported (and less dramatic) at-home accidents, drowning or electrocution.
In spite of their hold on our attention, we can often improve decision-making dramatically by simply understanding -and compensating for -these biases by making sure to base our decision on truly representative data and by modifying our procedures to compensate for information biases.
Anchoring. When making estimates people have a tendency to focus on one value or idea (the anchor) and not adjust away from it sufficiently. Researchers call this phenomenon "the anchoring bias". Anchoring is a common shortcut when people need to make an estimate and it creates many problems in intelligence-gathering and decision-making. We often provide a best guess before giving a ballpark range or confidence interval. For example, we usually estimate next years oil price before we come up with a confidence range (if at all). The price estimate becomes an anchor point and drags the high and low brackets, preventing them from moving far enough from the best estimate. The result: the high and low guesses aren't far enough apart, so that what we think is a 90 percent confidence range may only be 60 percent.
The anchoring effect has been documented in a number of studies.
3-8 In one the authors asked nearly one hundred managers: "What is your best estimate of the prime interest rate six months from now?" This was in 1983, when the real prime was around 11 percent.
Their average guess was right on target: 10.9 percent. This unanchored question served as a control benchmark.
Then the authors surveyed a second group with these two questions:
1. Do you believe that six months from now the prime rate will be above or below 8 percent? 2. What is you best estimate of the prime rate six months from now?
The idea was to check if the first question, designed to anchor subjects on 8 percent, would "drag" estimates below those of the unanchored group. It did. The average guess was now 10.5 percent. When the authors anchored a third group at 14 percent, their average estimate was 11.2 percent. Note how subtle anchoring can be. The authors never told the participants they thought 8 or 14 percent were reasonable guesses.
Did these anchors work just because the study group assumed that the person offering the anchor knows something they don't? Unfortunately for our pride in our own rationality, the answer is no. Several studies have deliberately used random anchors that could not possibly have been perceived to contain useful information. The results? Random anchors can affect people's opinions just as much as credible anchors.
Similarly, subtle changes in the wording of a question can have significant impact on how people respond. Table 2 is from Plous and shows questions that implicitly suggest appropriate responses.
The key take-away here is that readily available (but not necessarily relevant) numbers or ideas distort our final judgments because people fail to adjust away from them sufficiently.
How do we guard against the anchoring effect? The first line of defense is just to be aware of it and watchful of it. Secondly, when estimating we should start by providing a range, not a single-point value. It is very effective to move directly to providing a confidence range without first providing a "best guess" answer. A third line of defense is to work with multiple anchors rather than just one. Approach key estimates from several starting points. 
Question Mean
Answer Do you get headaches frequently, and if so, how often? 2.2/week Do you get headaches occasionally, and if so, how often? 0.7/week In terms of the total number of products, how many other products have you tried? 1? 5? 10? 5.2 products In terms of the total number of products, how many other products have you tried? 1? 2? 3? 3.3 products How long was the movie? 130 minutes How short was the movie? 100 minutes How tall was the basketball player? 79 inches How short was the basketball player? 69 inches
Uncertainty.
It is in the intelligence-gathering stage that we as decisionmakers seek to overcome uncertainty. We often hope that more information will at least reduce, if not eliminate, the discomforting uncertainty. The intent seems logical, and, in part, it is. Many of us were trained to manage just that way. We learned to work toward single numbers for all important parameters such reserves, production, oil price. When statistics and probability gained momentum in the oil & gas industry they were often viewed as tools and means for reducing and, ideally, eliminating uncertainty. At the corporate management level we learned that distilling past performance and future prospects to a set of numbers was crucial. Vague projections and expressions of doubt were signs of analytic weakness, so, faced with uncertainty, many of us ask for more facts, believing (with some justification) that more information will let us pinpoint which of the various options will succeed. We demanded precise forecasts -and ignored all the uncertainty embedded in them. We felt justifiably annoyed at colleagues who offered only loose estimates and wishy-washy "on the one hand, … but on the other hand" analyses. Unfortunately, in a world characterized by rapid change, and increased political and technical complexities, we are dealing not so much with trends as with surprises. Numerical precision may offer only a false sense of certainty. Even if real certainty were possible (and in our industry, it's not), the cost of obtaining it is unacceptably high. Delay long enough and we'll be left to cough in the exhaust of the car that just sped past. What do we as decision-makers do?
We believe that uncertainty must be reduced as far as make sense for any given situation, then it must be managed. Managing uncertainty doesn't mean accepting vague In the uncertain world of oil & gas exploration & production, rigor is not found in precise single-point predictions, but rather in precisely defined uncertainty estimates. It is not obtained by selecting the one right prediction for the future, but through a rigorous process that will enable us to anticipate and prepare for multiple futures.
Murphy was right: If anything can go wrong, it will -and decision-makers would do well to incorporate his wisdom into the decision-making process. The challenge for decisionmakers is not to eliminate all surprises, but to anticipate -and prepare for them. To do that, you must acknowledge uncertainty: uncover it, recognize it, understand it, and deal with it in an unbiased way. Most decision-makers know that as they gather information on the likelihood of a project's success, they must also assess the risks of failure. Yet few spend much time trying to systematically identify all the things that could cause a decision to fail or quantifying the chances that those events will occur. Even fewer of us consider the numerous ways we might capitalize upon uncertainty, turning it into a competitive advantage. 
?
The best tool for the task will depend largely on what type of uncertainty we face. We should select the simplest tool possible, without underestimating the complexity of the decision we face. The diagram in Figure 1 , developed by several management consultants at McKinsey & Co., 12 and modified for this paper, nicely illustrates the spectrum of possibilities. At Level 1, on the lower left, the future is relatively clear. While some uncertainty exists, it can be resolved by doing some research and it is well within the range of what can be predicted by a single forecast. This is a case of decisions making under certainty.
True Ambiguity

A Range of Futures
At Level 2, there is significant uncertainty and there is no way to tell what the outcome of the events under observation will be. However, in this case we have a reasonably good understanding of the probability distributions that govern the outcomes and their interactions. Many of the relevant reservoir parameters such as porosity, permeability, fault sealing, oil in place and reserves are of this nature. When facing this type of situation, we may use tools such as "prospective hindsight" , as discussed below, if the alternatives are few discrete and relatively easily defined. As uncertainty increases to a range of interrelated variables, more sophisticated tools, such as scenario planning and options thinking, are required.
Increasing
Levels of Uncertainty
A Clear Enough Future
The cardinal sin in a Level 3 case is to "force" the square peg of "uncertainty" into the round hole of a Level 2 problem, by becoming convinced without justification both of the probability distribution type and its parameters.
Finally, at Level 3, a truly ambiguous environment exists. In this case no probability can be meaningfully assigned to possible future results. An example of this is where one needs to make decisions based on whether future social, economical or political events occur -say, whether a war breaks out. Many thinkers believe that in such situations, where the future depends not only on the physical universe but critically on human actions, there are no laws that determine the outcome in any way; one is always "under uncertainty." In Keynes' words: 13 Level 3 type of problems also arise when entering new markets, exploring embryonic technologies (such as the Internet) or beginning operations in foreign countries and cultures. In such cases we will need to supplement the tools above with a framework and additional tools that enable us to learn quickly from experience.
By using these tools effectively, we will find that uncertainty is no longer the enemy but rather can give us a competitive edge. In fact, we may start to welcome it as your friend. We must never pretend uncertainty is smaller than it is and should only reduce uncertainty as far as it makes sense for a given decision. Then we need to manage it.
Calibration has also been shown to have value in the exploration & production industry. Royal Dutch Shell has used feedback with great success to help its geologists become better calibrated.
How do We Know What We Don't Know?
In the exploration & production business we face a significant element of uncertainty in every decision. How, then, do we assess accurately how much we really know in situations where so much is unknown? And how do we quantify how big the risks imposed by uncertainty really are?
These judgment flaws puzzled Shell's senior management, as the geologists possessed impeccable credentials. How could well-trained individuals be overconfident so much of the time? Put simply, their primary, or subject, knowledge was much more advanced than their metaknowledge, or knowledge about what they did, and did not, know. To develop a better sense of the limits of their knowledge required repeated feedback, which was coming too slowly and costing too much money. The first step is to abandon the false comfort of singlepoint predictions in favor of confidence-range estimates. Confidence-ranges can be far more useful than a numerically exact (but not exactly correct) prediction. It allows you to plan for the future with as much knowledge as currently exists or to invest in getting more and/or better information if the uncertainty is to large. Further, once a confidence-range estimate has been made, we can ask, "What additional information would allow us to narrow the range with an even higher level of confidence?" Providing levels of confidence will help us consciously assess whether our knowledge is sufficient or whether we need to seek additional information before making a decision. In this way we can calculate the value-of-information and evaluate the trade-off between collecting more information and building flexibility into the system. 14 Calibration. Setting confidence ranges is not much help, however, unless we have a fairly accurate assessment of just how much we really know. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. As discussed earlier, more often than not there exists a dangerous gap between what we actually know and what we think we know. This is also called overconfidence.
Fortunately, it is possible to become better "calibrated" -that is, to learn how to forecast confidence ranges more accurately. Feedback and accountability can help. Feedback that is accurate, timely, and precise tells us by how much our estimates missed the mark. Accountability forces us to confront that feedback, recalibrate our perceptions about primary knowledge, and temper our opinions accordingly.
U.S. Weather Service forecasters are one of the few professional groups who have been found to be well calibrated. 15 When U.S. Weather Service forecasters predicted a 30 percent chance of rain, as they did 15,536 times in one statistical study; it rained almost exactly 30 percent of the time. This superb calibration holds along the entire range of probability, except at the highest levels. When a 100 percent chance of rain is predicted, it actually rains only 90 percent of the time. This prediction error reflects deliberate caution on the part of the forecasters. 6 Shell noticed that newly hired geologists were wrong much more often than their levels of confidence implied. For instance, the junior geologists would estimate a 30 percent chance of finding oil, but when ten such wells were actually drilled, only one or two would produce. Obviously, drilling wells is very expensive and this type of overconfidence cost Shell millions of dry-well dollars.
In response. Shell designed a training program to help geologists develop calibration power. As part of this training, the geologists received numerous past cases of drilled wells that incorporated the many factors affecting oil deposits. For each case they had to provide best guesses for the probability of striking oil as well as ranges as to how much a successful well might produce. Then they were given feedback as to what had actually happened. The training worked wonderfully: now, when Shell geologists predict a 30 percent chance of producing oil, three out often times the company averages a hit.
In the two examples above the estimators were given precise, timely feedback about repeated judgments in a field whose knowledge base is relatively stable. Both groups were also held accountable by their supervisors or professional colleagues for the accuracy of their confidence judgments. Within a day, weather forecasters receive feedback about whether or not it rained and their predictive performance is factored into their salary increases and promotions.
In most professions, however, we don't get good feedback automatically, if ever at all. We will not learn how to calibrate unless there's a dependable and accurate feedback system. The key issue in calibration is to calibrate out metaknowledge, to learn to recognize how much we know and don't know, and not actually coming close to the right answers. If asset managers recognize they don't know why their wells produce as predicted, they can find out (most of the time). But if these managers believe they know, and their wrong, they are likely to adopt incorrect measures without any research at all. In most business decisions ignorance is not a bliss.
The Hidden Future. Rather than trying to pick the "mostcertain" future, decision-makers should learn to capitalize upon the doubt, generating multiple views of the future as a way to preserve the inherent uncertainty.
Thus, while we can't tell the future, we can try to be ready for whatever it brings by trying to expect the unexpected. By definition, the unexpected is difficult to anticipate. Overconfidence and availability bias cause people to underestimate the difficulties they will face: too few unexpected events that might delay a project come easily to mind when people are planning it. Many organizations fail to complete projects within time and budget forecasts.
Prospective Hindsight: "Back to the Future." Monday morning, after the football team has lost, every fan can see why the quarterback's pass to the tight end was a bad idea. The same is true after a political election or when a competitor succeeds in acquiring a takeover target. Hundreds of "Monday-morning quarterbacks" declare that the "quarterback" should have anticipated the problem. After all, it is so easy to see now.
Similarly, in hindsight, it is easy to laugh at Newton Baker's inability to imagine an airplane sinking a battleship or to shake our heads at Thomas Watson's inability to envision a digital future. In hindsight, our vision is often 20/20. Too bad it isn't so in foresight.
But maybe it could be. A number of experiments suggest that we can harness our ability to explain events in hindsight to better anticipate possibilities that still lie ahead. 16 Such "prospective hindsight" can be a valuable tool when contemplating an uncertain future.
To use prospective hindsight in decision-making, we simply need to pretend that whatever project or situation we are evaluating has already occurred. Then postulate the outcome in hindsight. For example, assume that a year from now our project turned out to be a fiasco, then list the reasons why it failed. By doing this we will probably see more reasons for an event when we pretend it has already happened than when we simply ask ourselves if it might occur.
As uncertainty increases, with several interrelated possible futures, we will need to turn to more sophisticated planning techniques. Decision-makers operating under severe time pressures may be tempted to reject these advanced techniques so as to "save time." But doing so often causes surprise and losses.
Knowing When Enough is Enough. If a little information is good, a little more will be better. Right? Not necessarily. In our desire to reduce uncertainty, we often ask for too much information. We believe -mistakenly -that more information will reduce uncertainty and give us a clearer picture of the future. However, more information helps only to the extent that we can use it intelligently. In fact, vast amounts of data may only confuse matters. Russo and Schoemaker 5 illustrate this through the following study:
Horse race handicappers typically use "past performance charts," which give nearly a hundred pieces of information on each horse and its history, to determine the likelihood that any given horse will win a race. In this study, researchers watched eight handicappers make predictions for numerous races. However, they limited the handicappers to using only five pieces of information per horse from the charts. The handicappers could use any five nuggets of data they wanted, and different handicappers often selected different pieces of information. The researchers then asked the handicappers to make the same predictions using ten pieces of information per horse, then with twenty pieces, and one last time using forty pieces of information for each horse in the race. In addition, they asked the handicappers, in each case, to estimate the likelihood that they had correctly picked the winning horse. The results are shown in Figure 2 . The research question of interest was whether the handicappers became more accurate in picking winners as they were given more information. They themselves felt that they would be. Their confidence in their predictive ability increased as the amount of information they were allowed to use increased. In reality, however, they were as accurate in their predictions using five pieces of information as they were using twenty or forty. More information helped little to improve the quality of their decisions. However, their metaknowledge -their ability to correctly predict how much they knew -declined dramatically. The more information they had, the more overconfident they became (without becoming more accurate).
Herein lies another danger for decision-makers. Past a certain point, more information will make us increasingly confident about our knowledge but may do little to improve the accuracy of our predictions. As stated earlier: we shouldn't pretend that we can reduce uncertainty any more than we really can. Instead, we need to incorporate uncertainty into the decision-making process which will help prepare us for whatever lies ahead. We need to learn to manage uncertainty well and not create an illusion of certainty.
Coming to Conclusions
We have by now gathered excellent intelligence, created some good options and incorporated uncertainty into the picture. We are ready to decide. Will we make the best choice? Not always. Many decision-makers pose their questions carefully, collect their information brilliantly but then "wing it" when it comes to actually deciding. They would do better to have a set of techniques for coming to conclusions.
There are a number of decision techniques available but for the purpose of this paper they can be summarized through the following three types of choosing techniques: intuition, rules-of-thumb or heuristics and multi-criterion modeling.
Intuition. Intuition has appeal. It is quick, easy and requires no tedious analysis, and it can sometimes be brilliant.
Researchers who have studied "intuition" find that these "gut" or "sixth sense" decisions actually follow a coherent path, but one that takes place so rapidly that people can't notice themselves doing it. 5 When applying automated expertise, highly seasoned professionals reach into their mental stores of past experience and rapidly match patterns of the current decision and context to those of an old situation. Then the matched pattern "fires off" the old action in the new situation.
For some professions, such as policemen, firefighters or emergency medical personnel, this may be the only option.
Unfortunately, many managers are way too confident in their intuition but still use it to make decisions. As a decisionmaking tool, intuition also has significant drawbacks. It is hard to dispute choices based on intuition because the decisionmakers can't articulate their own underlying reasoning. People "just know" they are right. We can't tell if the process is good or bad because there's no process to examine. It's so quick, so automatic, that there's no way to evaluate its quality. To those who study decision-making, the most striking feature of intuitive judgment is not its occasional brilliance but its rampant mediocrity.
Rules-of-Thumb. Much of our decision-making is rule-, or heuristics, based. And, like intuition, decision-making rules have their place. A good rule may provide a clever shortcut through a dizzying maze of possibilities.
Unfortunately, we don't always use rules judiciously and then often don't realize their inherent distortions. Sometimes we continue to use rules that have become outdated or inappropriate to the decision at hand.
Rules are often worthy attempts to gain speed and accuracy. They eliminate the random inconsistency of intuition and greatly simplify complex tasks. Unlike intuition, they are transparent; the underlying process used by the rule is clear. Rules, however, don't take into account all of the relevant information and they may not allow superior performance on some attributes to make up for poor performance on others. If we don't recognize the nature of our rules -and the biases inherent in them -we sooner or later pay the price of ignorance.
Multi-Criterion Modeling. As the decision increases in complexity and importance, the dangers of intuition and simple rules rise accordingly. Most high-value, high-risk exploration & production decisions are complex and include multiple objectives. Portfolio optimization is an example of a multi-criterion problem where the corporation not only seeks to optimize capital efficiency but may also have other objectives such as maximizing reserves replacement, maximizing net present value, minimizing finding and development costs, maximizing operating cash flow, etc. When we're facing important decisions that are complex and uncertain we must find a systematic way to rigorously evaluate the strength of the evidence and then pick the choice that the weight of evidence favors. This is where multicriterion or multiple-objective modeling becomes valuable.
Given the inherent limitations of intuition and rules-ofthumb, one might expect decision-makers to be delighted with the more consistent approach provided by such modeling techniques. Multiple-objective models can help process large amounts of information without losing valuable pieces. They never suffer from distraction, fatigue, boredom or random error. They are consistent, week after week. Once the model is built, the rating scheme and weights can be used again for future decisions.
Yet, in spite of these obvious advantages, most people treat these kinds of models with a nearly instinctive distaste. They are particularly resistant to the idea that simple models can validly make such subjective evaluations. For some, that resistance may stem simply from unfamiliarity with the statistics and probability involved. Many more, however, subscribe to the widespread assumption that human judgment is more discerning than a model. They are reluctant to believe that simple mathematical calculations can match the complexity of the human mind.
The evidence, however, proves otherwise. In a highway safety study, Colorado state officials had to decide how to allocate scarce funds to improve highway safety. 17 Traditionally, decisions as to which road segments would be upgraded were made by "expert intuition," as well as in response to political pressure from people who recently had relatives killed in an auto accident.
In the study, twenty-one experienced highway engineers were presented with information such as lane width, curves/mile, grade, traffic volume, intersections and so on for thirty-nine segments of a two-lane rural highway and were asked to predict which segments were the most dangerous. A weighted decision model was built based on the same criteria. Finally, the seven year accident rate was calculated for each highway segment to provide for an objective assessment of highway safety.
How did the experts do? On a scale where 1.00 represents a perfect match with the actual accident rate, their predictions achieved only 0.50. Even the most accurate engineer's predictions achieved only a 0.64 match. When the model was compared against the true accident rate, its predictions achieved a 0.80 match. No one with the skills of an experienced highway engineer enjoys being replaced by a model, especially a simple one that just multiplies and adds.
Study after study -in a wide range of fields -has come to the same conclusion: the benefits of consistency provided by decision-making models usually exceed any losses of human "complexity."
Implementation and Learning
Most professionals spend the bulk of their time executing and managing decisions and not just making them. While the merit of a particular decision should be based on the decision process, and not just the outcome as discussed earlier, implementation is an important part of what produces great decision results.
Even more important, our decision-making process does not end when we decide which alternative to pursue. Learning from experience, an integral part of any good decision-making process, is yet to come.
In a highly uncertain environment such as oil & gas exploration & production, assumptions about the unknown will often turn out to be wrong. We will likely experience deviations, often huge ones, from the original plan. If we have made a good decision and planned wisely, we should be able to adjust our course accordingly.
A particular challenge for management is deciding when to pull the plug and kill a project. The decision to initiate a project may have been good based on information available at the time but new information arises that puts the entire project in doubt. When that happens, decision-makers must guard strongly against a pernicious tendency to proceed -a phenomenon known as status quo bias.
A real options perspective is great for managing uncertainty and contingent decision-making. This is because real options are not static. Changing political conditions, competitor's actions, unexpected research outcomes, shifting strategic priorities and a host of other external and internal factors may affect decisions and the value of the embedded options over time. While most real options discussions focus on the nature and value of a real option at a given point in time, the primary benefit of real options can only be realized through effective implementation over time. 18 Implementing a decision involves a highly focused interaction in which we track and follow the consequences of our actions in light of explicit predictions or assumptions underlying the plan. This is good for decision-makers, but only if they recognize that true learning, amidst noise and distraction, requires discipline and analysis. Arie de Geus, formerly the group planning coordinator with Royal Dutch Shell, has written extensively about learning in organizations based on Shell's experience as an early practitioner of learning and adjustment in real time. [19] [20] Illusion-of-Control. While it may be human to claim credit when things turn out well and rationalize that we had no responsibility when they turn out badly, this mental bias is lethal to learning, destroying our chance to obtain objective feedback. Every outcome arises from a combination of skill and random chance -and it can be difficult to pinpoint exactly how much each factor contributed to the whole. But when this illusion-of-control distorts our perception of reality, it causes us to overestimate the odds of success.
The illusion-of-control is pervasive, even among those who claim know better. Once there is even a slight component of skill in a successful decision, it becomes extremely hard to acknowledge that a success may be due primarily to chance rather than ability. Illusions-of-control frequently cause people to repeat actions that in the past were followed by success. Only by realistically assessing the role of chance in successes can we learn which of our actions we should carefully repeat and which could be improved.
Conclusions
Oil and gas companies operate in an increasingly complex and uncertain world. The industry's history of consistent underperformance, implying a systematic over-estimation of returns and/or under-estimation of the risks of loss, clearly indicates a need for more realistic approach to decisionmaking and accounting for uncertainty. In order to improve our decision-making we need to fully understand, and work to counter and reduce, people's decision-making biases.
